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The Spanish economy
The recession that began in Spain in mid-2008 continued into 2009; it was especially virulent in the first 
half of the year, before gradually losing momentum in the second half. That said, in the year as a whole, 
there was a substantial fall in GDP (-3.6%). As the top panels of Chart 5.1 show, the fall-off in activity 
was similar to that seen in the euro area, although the breakdown was rather different. In Spain, the fall 
in output was accompanied by a severe contraction in national demand, which shrank by more than 
6%, very much sharper than the euro area correction. By contrast, in Spain net external demand cush-
ioned the impact of national demand on GDP, making a highly positive contribution of 2.8 pp of GDP, 
whereas in the euro area the foreign trade crisis led to a negative contribution from this sector in 2009.
The recession was more severe than in previous crises. As the central panels of Chart 5.1 
show, the rate of decline of GDP was much more marked in 2009 than during the recession of 
the early 1990s. This prompted the emergence of a highly significant output gap (albeit one no 
larger than in the previous recession), in part because, as is analysed in Chapter 2 of this Re-
port, the Spanish economy’s growth capacity was also affected by the crisis, as investment 
shrank and the unemployment rate rose very rapidly.
Private consumption and investment in housing are probably the two components that performed 
worst in comparison with similar cycles; however, as in the case of GDP, both are now out of their 
cyclical trough, and private consumption actually started to post positive rates of growth as from the 
closing months of 2009. In contrast, net exports made a greater contribution to growth than in 1992 
and 1993, despite the absence on this occasion of the impulse previously provided by currency de-
valuations. True, this positive contribution was due to the severe contraction in imports brought about 
by the extreme weakness of national demand, as exports were affected by the slump on the interna-
tional markets. The decline in activity fed through, with great intensity, to employment, which fell very 
sharply, prompting a surge in the unemployment rate. It also led to an unprecedented slowdown in the 
rate of inflation, which in 2009 stood below that of the euro area for the first time since the start of 
Monetary Union. In particular, the year-on-year rate of growth of the CPI excluding unprocessed food 
and energy has gradually fallen, from more than 3% in 2008 to almost zero at the beginning of 2010.
The gradual improvement in activity continued in the opening months of 2010. GDP rose 
slightly (0.1%) in Q1, after six consecutive quarters of negative growth rates, and inflation rose, 
albeit due, above all, to higher oil prices. The outlook for the Spanish economy is for a rela-
tively slow recovery in activity, meaning that although GDP has started to post positive rates of 
growth, the output gap will remain negative in the coming quarters; this reflects the difficulties 
of mobilising available productive resources and suggests that inflation will remain moderate. 
Moreover, as analysed in Chapters 1 and 2 of this Report, the introduction of certain struc-
tural reforms could speed the recovery, harnessing idle resources and countering the negative 
impact of the crisis on the Spanish economy’s growth capacity.
The cost of borrowing for the private sector is now low, having fallen since the end of 2008 
(see Chart 5.2). Since then, cuts in interbank rates have gradually passed through to lending 
rates, although only partially, as spreads have widened, mostly in the higher-risk segments 
(consumer credit and lending to SMEs). Conversely, lending standards and credit conditions 
other than interest rates remain tighter than before the crisis. These had progressively tight-
ened since the second half of 2007, and although this process came to a halt in mid-2009, 
there is still no sign of any significant turnaround. In turn, since late 2009 and in 2010 to date, 
the nominal effective exchange rate has depreciated, helping to ease monetary conditions.
1 Monetary and financial 
conditions
The cost of borrowing for the 
private sector has fallen, but the 
other credit conditions remain 
tighter than before the financial 
crisis
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From a historical perspective, Spanish government debt yields are also relatively low, espe-
cially in the case of short-term instruments, in keeping with the expansionary monetary policy 
stance. In turn, medium and long-term bond yields have been influenced by the changes in 
market perception and assessment of sovereign risk, especially after the crisis heightened in 
autumn 2008. During the opening months of 2010, the 10-year bond spread over the German 
bund fluctuated, widening notably in April and May as a consequence of the heightening of the 
Greek public finance crisis and the contagion effect on the debt markets of other countries 
which, like Spain, had high budget deficits.
Household net wealth continued to shrink in 2009 and in the opening months of 2010, due 
above all to falling house prices, although their rate of decline has moderated in recent quar-
Spanish government debt 
yields are also low, although in 
recent months they have borne 
the brunt of the strains in the 
sovereign debt markets
Household net wealth continues 
to shrink
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a. The cost of equity is based on the three-stage Gordon dividend discount model. 
b. The interest rate on long-term fixed income is calculated as the sum of the 5-year euro swap rate 
and the weighted average of the credit risk insurance premia of Spanish non-financial corporations 
at that same term. 
c. Indicator = % of institutions reporting a considerable tightening x 1 + % of institutions reporting 
some tightening x 1/2 - % of institutions reporting some easing x 1/2 - % of institutions reporting 
considerable easing  x 1. 
d. The broken line indicates forecasts made the previous quarter by respondents. 
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ters. Stock prices recovered sharply in 2009, as the IBEX 35 posted gains of almost 30%, al-
though in 2010 to date they have fallen back substantially (and especially in April and May).
The latest data show that household debt has stabilised somewhat, after posting marginally nega-
tive growth year-on-year at end-2009. In contrast, corporate debt has continued to shrink in recent 
months, especially lending by resident institutions (−4.2% year-on-year at March 2010). Notwith-
standing, the debt ratios of households and firms have fallen only marginally and remain very high, 
due to the unfavourable trajectory of income. However, lower interest rates have meant that the 
debt burden has declined, reducing the pressure on indebted agents. Conversely, the latest data 
on general government debt reflect a notable increase (with year-on-year rates of growth ap-
proaching 30%), linked to the extensive financing needs resulting from the high budget deficit.
Fiscal policy was expansionary in 2009, against a backdrop of recession. The State and 
regional government budgets for 2009 and the outturn during the year included numer-
ous measures, estimated at almost 2 pp of GDP, designed to cushion the effects of the 
crisis on demand (see Table 5.1). Notable among these, on the expenditure side, were 
the introduction of the State Fund for Local Investment and the Special State Fund to 
Invigorate the Economy and Employment, amounting to €11 billion, and on the receipts 
Household credit is stable and 
corporate credit is contracting, 
but debt ratios are down only 
marginally
2 Economic policies
2.1 FISCAL POLICY
Against the backdrop of 
recession, fiscal policy was 
highly expansionary in 2009
FISCAL AND FINANCIAL MEASURES 2009 
WITH IMPACT ON THE BUDGET BALANCE (I - II) -23,975
I Revenue -11,500
Monthly VAT refunds brought forward -5,600
Elimination of wealth tax -2,300
€400 tax rebate on earned income under personal income tax (a) -1,900
Inclusion of tax credit on home ownership (main residence) in calculation of personal income tax withholdings -500
Rebates on social security contributions in order to promote part-time hiring -1,200
II Expenditure 12,475
State Fund for Local Investment 7,700
Special State Fund to Invigorate the Economy and Employment 3,000
Unemployment benefits (one-off payment for becoming self-employed and the €420 assistance payments) 975
Car purchase subsidy 800
With impact on public debt 16,250
Fund for the Acquisition of Financial Assets 9,500
Fund for the Orderly Restructuring of the Banking Sector 6,750
Funding Amount Used
TOTAL 43,100 20,387
ICO credit facility to guarantee local councils' debts to firms and the self-employed 3,000 NA
ICO liquidity facility for SMEs and the self-employed  to finance current assets (b) 16,000 8,453
ICO corporate support facilities 2009 (for SMEs, internationalisation, entrepreneurs and business growth) 10,900 6,245
ICO-PROINMED credit facility (investment projects for medium-sized companies) 3,000 NA
ICO-FTVPO facility: extension of ICO guarantee for asset-backed securities linked to government-subsidised housing 5,000 2,510
ICO housing credit facility: loans for completed housing for rental (main residence) 3,000 1,130
Plan Renove Turismo (tourism industry modernisation programme) 1,000 1,000
Plan VIVE (vehicle renewal programme) 700 700
ICO-FuturE credit facility to modernise and improve the Spanish tourist industry 500 349
2009 
ICO (Official Credit Institute) CREDIT FACILITIES
MAIN STIMULUS MEASURES APPLIED IN 2009 TABLE 5.1 
NA: No quantitative estimate is available. 
 
a. Measure introduced in 2008. It will be partially withdrawn in 2010. 
b. The ICO contributes 50% and the banks the other 50%. 
€m 
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side, the approval of a monthly VAT refund schedule, aiming to enhance firms’ liquidity. 
Moreover, the heightening of the economic slowdown triggered the automatic stabilisers 
and unemployment benefits rose to almost 3% of GDP, double the figure recorded two 
years earlier.
Tax revenue fell sharply in 2009, by almost 6 pp of GDP against the 2007 figure. This can-
not be attributed solely to business cycle-related factors, as it is largely connected with the 
drop in the extraordinary revenue associated, above all, with the real estate boom of the 
decade prior to the economic crisis (see Table 5.2). In effect, although revenue from almost 
all taxes declined, the decrease was especially notable in indirect taxes and corporate in-
come tax.
In turn, public spending continued to grow above the economy’s trend GDP, even discounting the 
effect of the discretionary measures adopted and the impact of the automatic stabilisers. Govern-
ment consumption rose particularly sharply; this includes the general government sector wage 
bill, which was almost 3 pp of GDP higher than in 2007, and pensions, which were 1 pp of GDP 
higher over the same period. The interest burden rose significantly, owing to the increase in pub-
lic debt.
Moreover, in 2009 tax revenue 
fell sharply, particularly as a 
result of the disappearance of 
the extraordinary revenue 
associated with the real estate 
boom …
… while public spending 
maintained its strong 
momentum
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
1 NON-FINANCIAL RESOURCES 38.9 39.8 40.8 41.5 37.5 35.3
Current resources 38.1 39.1 40.1 41.0 37.3 35.4
— Taxes on products and imports 11.9 12.2 12.3 11.7 9.9 8.7
— Taxes on income and wealth 10.2 10.9 11.7 12.9 10.8 9.6
— Social contributions 13.0 12.9 12.9 13.0 13.1 13.4
— Other current resources (a) 3.1 3.0 3.2 3.4 3.4 3.7
Capital resources (b) 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.5 0.2 -0.1
2 NON-FINANCIAL USES (c) 39.3 38.9 38.8 39.6 41.5 46.5
Current uses (c) 34.0 34.0 33.7 34.2 36.2 40.6
— Final consumption 17.8 18.0 18.0 18.4 19.4 21.2
11.7 11.6 11.5 11.6 12.4 14.6
— Subsidies 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.1
— Interest (c) 2.0 1.8 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.8
1.5 1.5 1.6 1.5 1.7 2.0
Capital uses 5.2 4.9 5.1 5.4 5.3 5.9
— Gross capital formation 3.4 3.6 3.7 4.0 3.8 4.4
— Other capital uses (d) 1.9 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6
3
-0.3 1.0 2.0 1.9 -4.1 -11.2
MEMORANDUM ITEM:
Primary surplus 1.7 2.8 3.7 3.5 -2.5 -9.4
Gross debt (b) 46.2 43.0 39.6 36.2 39.7 53.2
NET LENDING (+) OR NET
BORROWING (-) (c) (3=1-2)
— Social benefits other than social transfers in kind
— Other transfers
SOURCES: INE, Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda and Banco de España. 
 
a. Includes gross operating surplus. 
b. The negative sign in 2009 is due to the adjustment for uncertain revenue included with that sign 
in these resources. 
c. According to the Excessive Deficit Procedure methodology. 
d. Includes net acquisitions of non-financial non-produced assets. 
% of GDP 
MAIN GENERAL GOVERNMENT NON-FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS TABLE 5.2 
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As a result, the end-year general government deficit was 11.2% of GDP, signifying an 
unprecedented deterioration in the budget position of more than 7 pp of GDP on a 
year earlier and of more than 13 pp in comparison with the 2007 budget surplus. In 
turn, public debt exceeded 50% of GDP. A substantial part of this debt is structural 
and will not correct automatically as the economy recovers or as the stimulus meas-
ures adopted during the crisis are withdrawn. A more intense fiscal effort will thus be 
needed to reduce both the deficit and public debt. And this could become even more 
demanding if, as discussed in Chapter 2 of this Report, the crisis were to prove to have 
a significant impact on potential growth and the course of interest rates were re-
versed.
Thus, for the second consecutive year, in 2009 the general government deficit exceeded the 
limits established in the budgetary stability legislation. In April 2009, under the framework of 
the Stability and Growth Pact, the European Council declared that Spain was running an 
excessive deficit and recommended that this situation be corrected by 2012 at the latest. 
Subsequently, in November 2009, in light of the exceptionally adverse macroeconomic situ-
ation, the Council extended the deadline to end-2013. It also asked to see an annual average 
fiscal adjustment of the general government sector in excess of 1.5% of GDP as from 
2010.
In this setting, in January 2010 the government presented a new Stability Programme Update 
(SPU), incorporating significant budgetary consolidation up to 2013, by which time the gen-
eral government deficit should stand at 3% of GDP. This would entail deficit cuts of 1.6 pp of 
GDP in 2010, and of 2.3 pp of GDP per annum between 2011 and 2013. These cuts would 
be essentially structural, based not only on the tax increases already introduced but also, and 
above all, on the public spending cuts outlined in the Programme. In particular, in addition to 
the partial elimination of the €400 earned income tax rebate and the increase in tax rates on 
savings and VAT rates, the State budget for 2010 and the regional governments’ budgets 
factored in lower expenditure. The SPU also provided for a further public spending cut of 
0.5% of GDP for 2010 (the Immediate Action Plan); this has been approved and includes a 
reduction, without exceptions, in public-sector vacancies in 2010 to 10% of the replacement 
rate, together with the decision to make no new temporary hires. The SPU also includes an 
austerity plan for the period 2011-2013, and framework agreements on the sustainability of 
public finances with regional and local governments that should signify further public spend-
ing cuts of 3.8 pp of GDP up to 2013. The breakdown of the spending cuts envisaged be-
tween 2009 and 2013 is as follows: employee compensation (–1.9% of GDP); inputs, trans-
fers and other expenses (–1% of GDP); public investment (–0.9% of GDP); and subsidies 
(–0.5% of GDP).
Subsequently, in light of the worsening of the Greek public finance crisis and the conta-
gion effect on other countries’ debt markets, the Spanish government, in coordination 
with the other euro area countries, responded by quickening the pace of the fiscal con-
solidation programme, to avoid a downturn that would have had serious consequences 
for the economy and for the stability of the euro area. The package of measures approved 
in May 2010 entails bringing forward a substantial part of the deficit reduction effort, act-
ing directly on the structural component, which could be cut by more than half, bringing 
the budget deficit to 6% of GDP in 2011. The specific measures adopted included: cutting 
general government employees’ wages by 5% in 2010, followed by a wage freeze in 2011; 
cutting State public investment by €6 billion between 2010 and 2011; freezing pensions 
in 2011; and removing as from 2011 the existing benefits for birth and adoption of chil-
dren.
As a result, the budget deficit, 
which is eminently structural, 
stood at all-time highs at end-
2009, while public debt 
breached the level of 50% of 
GDP
In this setting, the European 
Council declared that Spain 
was running an excessive 
deficit and recommended it be 
corrected by 2013 at the latest
In response to this 
recommendation, the 
government presented a fiscal 
consolidation programme
After the Greek crisis worsened, 
the government resolved to 
speed up and strengthen this 
programme, introducing, in May 
2010, a package of adjustment 
measures designed to cut the 
budget deficit to 6% of GDP in 
2011, more than 5 pp below its 
2009 level
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Not only are these ambitious targets, but in many cases the spending cuts envisaged are un-
precedented, since in most cases in the past expenditure was simply frozen. Rigorous execu-
tion and control will be needed to permit timely identification of possible deviations, with the 
necessary corrective measures. The collaboration of the regional and local governments will 
also be needed. In this respect, the new funding system of the ordinary-regime regional gov-
ernments approved in 2009 improves the allocation of resources to them, as it strengthens the 
autonomy of the system and the shared responsibility for raising taxes, lifting the tax assign-
ment percentages. For successful fiscal consolidation to be achieved, this should be comple-
mented by an improvement in the regional governments’ fiscal coordination and discipline 
mechanisms.
Moreover, given the traditionally high inertia in public spending, if its growth is to be curbed 
permanently, measures will be needed to interrupt its underlying trends, especially in areas 
such as pension or health expenditure which will bear the brunt of population ageing. The re-
form of the pensions system is also especially timely at this juncture, as some changes in the 
system could enhance the long-term sustainability of public finances, with little impact on 
growth in the short term. In this respect, the government proposes raising the retirement age 
and improving the degree of contributiveness of the system. Both these measures are in the 
right direction and, if applied sufficiently ambitiously, may lead to a significant improvement in 
public finances in the long term.
The main aim of the other economic policies launched in the year was to mitigate the effects 
of the economic crisis, via measures to sustain income, to support employment and to ease 
access to credit or demand for certain sectors, largely furthering the steps taken in 2008. 
Particularly noteworthy were the extension of unemployment benefits for a further six months, 
the introduction of car purchase incentive schemes and the launch by the ICO (Official Credit 
Institute) of further extraordinary credit lines for groups that have been especially hard hit by 
the crisis (see Table 5.1).
However, the severity of the crisis revealed the limitations of these measures in the short term 
and the need to introduce structural reforms, to prevent the adverse conjunctural situation 
reducing the future potential growth rate. It is also necessary to ensure that the short-term 
measures do not become permanent ones, as this could distort the efficient allocation of re-
sources and dissuade job-seekers. The most concrete progress made on structural reforms 
was connected, above all, with the transposition of the Services Directive, a number of meas-
ures relating to the rental market and the draft Sustainable Economy Law.
Regarding the transposition of the Services Directive, two pieces of legislation were passed in 
2009, the “Umbrella Law” and the “Omnibus Law”, aimed at reducing the administrative bur-
den on firms and liberalising the sector. Achievement of both these objectives is vital, given the 
importance of the services sector in the Spanish economy, the characteristics of the produc-
tive structure (dominated by small firms that are especially affected by administrative burdens) 
and the persistence of barriers to entry that particularly restrict competition in some sectors, 
such as retailing.
Insofar as reductions in the administrative burden are concerned, under the Omnibus Law, 
among other changes, some authorisation regimes are removed while others are replaced 
with ex-post controls. The draft Sustainable Economy Law develops this aspect further, pro-
posing measures to simplify and make it easier to establish commercial companies and reduc-
ing fees and charges. If effectively applied, these measures could bring about a significant 
reduction in both the time and money needed for business start-ups.
The targets are ambitious and 
the measures taken and 
planned are unprecedented, 
requiring rigorous execution 
and control and the 
collaboration of the regional and 
local governments
High inertia in public spending 
in the past means measures are 
needed to redirect underlying 
trends
2.2 OTHER ECONOMIC POLICIES
All other economic policy 
actions were geared to 
mitigating the immediate effects 
of the crisis
Transposition of the Services 
Directive should reduce the 
administrative burden …
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The success of the reform will depend on the extent to which it is effectively applied in certain 
key sectors, such as professional services and the retail trade. In this respect, the Omnibus Law 
amends the legislation on professional institutions and associations, removing, inter alia, restric-
tions on advertising these services and fee schedule guidelines. However, removal of the require-
ments to belong to the relevant professional institution or association and to obtain approvals 
from them has been left for a later date. In 2010 a new “Trading Law” was approved, limiting the 
circumstances in which regional governments can refuse authorisation for the opening of certain 
retail formats, though some restrictions remain, connected with “reasons of general interest” that 
are not sufficiently detailed. Accordingly, the new Law may not be rigorous enough to make any 
substantial change in the existing authorisation regimes applicable to the retail sector approved 
by the regional governments, which have effectively restricted competition.
The limited development of the rental market in Spain causes various inefficiencies, as it re-
stricts the geographical mobility of workers and limits housing affordability. Recently, several 
steps have been taken in an attempt to remedy this. From a fiscal standpoint, the draft Sus-
tainable Economy Law aims to further rebalance the tax treatment of rental and owner-occu-
pied housing, removing the tax credit on purchase of principal residence for high-income 
taxpayers. In turn, under the 2009-2012 Housing Plan, at least 40% of all new subsidised 
housing projects must be rental housing. Moreover, the Law on Measures to Promote and 
Facilitate Renting approved in 2009, amends various provisions of the Civil Procedure Law and 
of the Urban Rentals Law. These changes could act as a catalyst for rental markets, but the 
more restrictive aspects of the existing legislation, such as minimum duration of contracts and 
compulsory rent indexation to consumer price inflation, remain unchanged.
On a longer time scale, the government approved the Sustainable Economy Strategy, which 
establishes a series of targets for 2020. This broadly signifies extending the targets set in the 
previous National Reform Plans, designed to foster long-term growth. The Strategy is based 
on three instruments: a structural reform programme, the draft Sustainable Economy Law and 
the Sustainable Economy Fund, designed to finance environment, knowledge and innovation, 
and social projects. The draft law has a broad scope, notably including, in addition to those 
mentioned above, measures to improve the regulatory environment. It specifically envisages 
the need for prior analysis of the regulatory impact of all initiatives and proposes several 
changes to regulatory bodies that could make them more independent, such as placing a six-
year non-renewable limit on terms of office.
As regards labour market reform and as at the date of this Report going to press, the outline 
of the government’s proposed reform is known – including limits on temporary hires and incen-
tives for permanent hires – but not the details of the specific measures that may be applied. 
Insofar as wages are concerned, an agreement was signed in February 2010 establishing col-
lectively bargained wage settlements of up to 1% in 2010, followed by 1%-2% in 2011 and 
1.5%-2.5% in 2012. This will entail some easing in labour costs, especially in 2010. A multi-
year wage indexation clause was also agreed, which could mitigate some of the adverse ef-
fects of these indexation mechanisms. Discussion of the more structural aspects of collective 
bargaining reform was postponed. 
Lastly, significant regulatory changes were made in the financial system, substantially broad-
ening the range of elements and instruments available for adapting and restructuring institu-
tions. These changes are examined in detail in Box 6.1 of this Report.
National demand fell by 6% in 2009, as the adjustment that had begun at the end of 2007 
heightened. The contraction was extensive to all components of private expenditure (see Chart 5.3), 
… and increase competition in 
the sector, though in the 
specific case of retail trade the 
new Law may possibly not be 
sufficiently ambitious
There were several legislative 
initiatives concerning the rental 
market, though the most 
restrictive aspects relating to 
freedom of contract remain
The Sustainable Economy 
Strategy extends the targets 
established in the previous 
National Reform Plans to 2020
In the labour market, progress 
was made towards a new wage 
agreement and structural 
reforms were discussed as part 
of the social dialogue
3 Demand
3.1 NATIONAL DEMAND
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which was hit hard by the consequences of the financial crisis on agents’ confidence and on 
financing conditions. There was a big drop in business investment but, in proportion to the 
decline in GDP, not out of keeping with past performance. Less in step with past performance 
was the sharp fall in household expenditure, which was most adversely affected by the wors-
ening expectations stemming from the severe labour market deterioration, and by other fac-
tors such as high debt levels. With fiscal policy acting as a buffer, general government demand 
posted positive growth.
Household consumption fell by 4.9% in 2009, with a decline in all its components. Purchases 
of consumer durables, which had contracted by almost 20% in 2008 (see Table 5.3), posted 
a somewhat more moderate rate of decrease in 2009 thanks to the low-emission vehicle pur-
chase incentive schemes that gave a strong boost to new car registrations as from May. By 
contrast, the rate of decline of household spending on services, which represents 50% of 
private consumption, steepened as the year progressed.
Moreover, this severe adjustment in household spending contrasted with the positive growth 
– albeit lower than a year earlier – seen in disposable income (see Chart 5.4). In fact, in spite 
of the moderation in compensation per employee, of job destruction and of the decline in the 
surplus of sole proprietors, disposable income rose by 1.1% in real terms in 2009. The notable 
expansionary effect of fiscal policy helped sustain household income, which also benefited 
from lower net interest payments and lower inflation.
As a consequence of the foregoing, the household saving ratio rose significantly: in the wake 
of a 2 pp increase in 2008, it rose again, by 6 pp, to 18.8% in 2009. This growth path contrasts 
with the more moderate performance seen in other European countries and may be due to 
several factors, although the relative significance of each is difficult to determine. In particular, 
lower income growth prospects, as a result of falling employment, and the decline in real 
household wealth would seemingly have prompted households to save more, so as to moder-
ate the future reduction in spending. Moreover, the growing uncertainty that accompanied the 
heightening of the financial crisis and the rapid deterioration of the labour market would seem 
National demand underwent a 
severe adjustment in 2009, 
falling by slightly more than 6%
Private consumption fell back 
sharply, mitigated only by the 
car purchase incentive schemes
The saving ratio rose 
significantly, largely due to the 
backdrop of greater uncertainty 
for consumer decision-taking
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to have dampened consumption and raised precautionary saving. In turn, tighter bank lending 
conditions would have had a dual impact, limiting credit purchases and fuelling the propensity 
to save with a view to building up liquidity cushions. Lastly, the deterioration of public finances 
may also have encouraged consumers to save more, insofar as it may have raised doubts over 
the sustainability of public finances in the medium term.
Despite the difficulties involved in assessing the relative weight of each of the above-mentioned 
factors, it seems reasonable to assume that, in a less uncertain climate, the adjustment in 
consumption would have been less severe and the increase in the saving ratio more modest, 
as signalled by simulations with models that combine long-term trends in consumption, in-
come and wealth.
Although still short of pre-crisis levels (see Chart 5.4), household confidence indicators began to 
recover in 2009. Accordingly, the negative impact that uncertainty has had on consumption could 
foreseeably start to be reversed in 2010. However, income is expected to continue to moderate in 
the year, as it did in the second half of 2009, in light of the diminished fiscal policy contribution due 
to both the withdrawal of the stimulus measures applied in previous years and the public-sector 
wage cut. That means that the household debt ratio will continue on its slow downward path.
The household saving ratio is 
expected to decline, and 
consumption to gradually 
recover, in 2010
% of GDP (a) RATE OF CHANGE (b)
2000 2009 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
HOUSEHOLDS AND NPISHs
Final consumption expenditure 59.7 56.0 4.2 4.2 3.8 3.6 -0.6 -4.9
Durable consumption 6.3 3.3 10.7 6.4 4.7 4.8 -19.5 -15.9
Non-durable consumption 53.4 52.7 3.5 4.0 3.7 3.5 1.2 -4.1
Housing 6.1 5.9 5.9 6.1 6.2 3.0 -10.3 -24.5
CORPORATIONS
Private productive investment (c) 16.6 14.1 6.7 7.4 7.7 3.7 -1.3 -17.6
Construction 4.8 5.3 12.3 5.7 4.8 -1.7 3.6 -6.0
Equipment 7.3 4.7 4.3 9.1 10.5 8.6 -3.0 -28.1
Other products (d) 4.4 4.2 3.8 7.1 7.5 3.6 -4.3 -17.2
GENERAL GOVERNMENT
Final consumption expenditure 17.2 21.2 6.3 5.5 4.6 5.5 5.5 3.8
Gross fixed capital formation 3.2 4.4 -3.8 7.8 7.5 13.2 -4.1 14.4
Construction 2.3 3.2 -8.4 7.3 8.1 13.8 -7.4 16.9
Equipment 0.8 1.1 11.0 9.3 6.0 11.4 6.1 7.8
MEMORANDUM ITEM
Gross fixed capital formation 25.8 24.4 5.1 7.0 7.2 4.6 -4.4 -15.3
Equipment 8.1 5.8 5.1 9.2 9.9 9.0 -1.8 -23.1
— Machinery 5.7 3.9 3.5 6.9 10.3 10.4 0.0 -26.5
— Transport 2.4 2.0 8.7 14.0 9.1 6.0 -5.5 -15.0
Construction 13.3 14.4 5.4 6.1 6.0 3.2 -5.5 -11.2
— Housing 6.1 5.9 5.9 6.1 6.2 3.0 -10.3 -24.5
— Other construction 7.2 8.5 5.0 6.2 5.8 3.3 -0.4 1.6
Other products (d) 4.4 4.2 3.8 7.1 7.5 3.6 -4.3 -17.2
CONSUMPTION AND GROSS FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION BY INSTITUTIONAL SECTOR TABLE 5.3 
SOURCES: INE and Banco de España. 
 
a. National Accounts, base 2000, current prices. 
b. National Accounts, base 2000, rates of change of volume indices. 
c. Includes investment by sole proprietors. 
d. This investment includes real estate, legal, accounting, consultancy and software services, among others. 
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Weak household demand was evident not only in the sharp decline in their consumption spend-
ing, but also in their notable reluctance to acquire property. Weighed down by the severe labour 
market deterioration and the downward revision of expectations for property price appreciation, 
the cumulative decline in the number of transactions between the last cyclical peak and 2009 
is over 50%, and slightly lower (around 40%) in the case of new housing (see Chart 5.5). This, 
together with the rising volume of finished housing, prompted a decline in housing starts and 
exacerbated the contraction in residential investment, which fell by some 25% in 2009. That 
said, housing demand appears to have stabilised in recent months. Box 5.1 presents a detailed 
analysis of the macroeconomic implications of the housing market adjustment. So far, the ad-
justment in property prices is proving somewhat slower than in previous downturns.
The drop in the number of housing starts was mainly concentrated in the open-market housing 
segment, which accounted for almost 90% of the cumulative decline from the peak. Housing 
Against a backdrop of weak 
housing demand, the decline in 
the volume of works in progress 
prompted a sharp fall in 
residential investment
The weight of subsidised 
housing is growing considerably 
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Between the mid-1990s and 2007 Spain’s real estate market 
was extremely buoyant. As a result the construction sector 
gained considerable and increasing weight in the economy as a 
whole, the debt of households and of construction-related com-
panies climbed swiftly and house prices became overvalued. 
This upturn has been followed by a strong and ongoing adjust-
ment. The fall in demand, initially driven by higher financing costs 
and, later, by the recession, following the onset of the interna-
tional financial crisis, triggered a rapid supply response in the 
form of a marked drop in housing starts, which has continued 
until recently. The number of housing starts in 2009 was only 20% 
of its 2006 level, when it was at its highest (see Panel 1). Never-
theless, given that house building has a long production period, 
the completion of previously started projects has meant that, be-
tween 2007 and 2009, the number of housing completions far 
outnumbered housing starts and, in any case, vastly exceeded 
demand.
This decoupling between residential supply and demand has built up 
a stock of unsold housing units, the quantification of which is com-
plex and not without controversy, given the differences between the 
various statistical sources.1 Notwithstanding the uncertainty sur-
rounding these figures, the size of the stock is high, and it can be 
assumed that it will condition new housing starts over the coming 
years. That said, since housing is a good that is traded in local mar-
kets, the coexistence of a large volume of unsold housing nationwide 
with local markets that are balanced – or that even have a degree of 
unsatisfied demand – is, in principle, possible. This would set a lower 
limit to the number of housing starts in the short and medium term.
These real estate sector dynamics are reflected strongly in the resi-
dential investment variable in National Accounts, which includes 
changes in new works and the refurbishment of existing housing. 
The contribution of new works has been highly negative since 2008, 
BOX 5.1THE ADJUSTMENT OF THE SPANISH REAL ESTATE SECTOR AND ITS MACROECONOMIC IMPACT
1. Own estimates, based on statistics from administrative acts (building com-
pletion certificates and notarial records on property transfers), seem to suggest 
that, at end-2009, the stock of unsold housing units could have been in the 
range of 2.8%-4.4% of the total housing stock at that time. It is estimated that 
this percentage would be approximately 2.5 pp higher than at end-2005.
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a. Cumulative four-quarter data. 
b. Forecasts for housing starts and completions are based on a scenario of building permits for the period 2010-2011 close to 2009 levels 
and a production period of 18 months. 
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BOX 5.1THE ADJUSTMENT OF THE SPANISH REAL ESTATE SECTOR AND ITS MACROECONOMIC IMPACT (cont´d)
as it depends on the difference between the number of housing 
starts and completions at any given time, which has declined con-
tinuously since 2007 and is not projected to stabilise until 2011. 
However, the refurbishment component —albeit relatively smaller in 
size2— is performing countercyclically, which is partially buffering the 
fall in residential investment. As a result of the combined changes of 
the two components, residential investment posted year-on-year 
declines of 10% and 25% in 2008 and 2009, respectively, and is 
forecast to continue to contract, although at an increasingly lower 
pace until mid-2011. At the end of that year, once the adjustment 
has ended, it is estimated that the ratio of residential investment to 
GDP in real terms could stand at approximately 4%, which would be 
around 3.5 pp below its high in 2007 and less than its low in 1994, 
giving an idea of the scale of the restructuring of the sector (see 
Panel 2).
This adjustment is coupled with a correction of house prices, which 
had increased very notably during the upturn. On Ministry of Housing 
statistics, until 2009 prices seemingly dropped by 10% on average 
from the highs posted in 2007; this decline to date is on a slightly 
smaller scale than that observed in the cycle at the beginning of the 
1990s. This process may not yet be over, although in recent quarters 
the rate of decline in prices has slowed, probably as a result of the 
improvement in affordability indicators prompted, in particular, by the 
substantial reduction in mortgage interest rates. Other factors which 
may be contributing to containing the decline in prices in the short 
term are the fiscal changes already approved (such as the rise in VAT 
rates in July 2010) and other measures envisaged (such as the aboli-
tion of house-purchase tax credits above a determined income 
threshold in January 2011).
This housing market adjustment, both in terms of amounts and 
prices, is having very severe macroeconomic implications in the 
context of the current recession. A starting point for measuring 
such effects is to record the figures reflecting the direct impact on 
Spanish economic activity of residential investment during the ad-
justment phase, calculated through this component’s contributions 
to GDP growth. Based on this approach, investment in housing 
could directly shave approximately 1 pp off average annual GDP 
growth in the period 2008-2011, the maximum negative contribu-
tion per year would be 2 pp in 2009 (see Panel 3). In cumulative 
terms, the contraction of housing investment would seemingly sub-
tract around 4 pp from GDP in 2001 in comparison with its level at 
end-2007.3
In any event, this calculation provides a lower limit to the size of 
the effects, since the assessment of the macroeconomic conse-
quences of the housing sector restructuring process must take 
into account further channels of transmission, which affect the 
rest of domestic demand and net exports. The Quarterly Macr-
oeconometric Model of the Banco de España (MTBE) was used to 
approximate the size of the total effects. In this model, the de-
crease in residential investment leads to a reduction of activity 
and, consequently, of productive investment. The resulting decline 
in employment gives rise to second round effects, since it impacts 
household disposable income and, therefore, their expenditure. 
Furthermore, lower demand for housing triggers a decrease in 
house prices, reducing in turn household wealth and having a fur-
ther negative impact on household spending. According to the 
MTBE, it is estimated that the total impact of the residential ad-
justment would be −1.3 pp of GDP, in average annual terms, and 
−5.4 pp, in cumulative terms, at end-2011 (see Panel 4).4 It should 
be noted that this estimate does not include the foreseeable pos-
itive effects on GDP growth which will take place when the secto-
ral reallocation of surplus productive resources in housing con-
struction happens (these effects are not envisaged here because 
most of them will probably occur outside the timescale consid-
ered).
The estimate presented in this box of the macroeconomic impact 
of the housing market adjustment in 2010 and 2011 is obviously 
subject to various sources of uncertainty, including the pace at 
which the surplus supply that has built up is absorbed which, in 
turn, depends on actual demand for new housing. In respect of 
the latter, the INE’s most recent demographic projections indicat-
ing a significant moderation in population growth suggest that 
medium-term housing needs will be lower. Nevertheless, the high 
prices in the final years of the boom and, recently, the less favour-
able climate for gaining access to finance have probably prevent-
ed certain potential buyers from entering this market and, conse-
quently, the existence of pent-up demand cannot be ruled out 
which could materialise as a result of the ongoing price adjust-
ment and the gradual normalisation of credit conditions in the 
future.
2. According to the Housing Satellite Account, the weight of refurbishment ac-
tivities in total housing investment is nearly 21%. 3. This impact includes the 
effect of lower demand for residential investment as a percentage of the value 
added of construction and of other branches involved in housing production. 
4. The exercise performed compares the scenario defined by the values ob-
served for residential investment and house prices until 2009 Q4 and the pro-
jections for these two variables until 2011, which are included in the latest 
Banco de España Projections Report, with another scenario in which residen-
tial investment would have remained constant until 2011 at the level observed 
in 2007 Q3 and house prices would have moved on a path compatible with this 
alternative level of investment. Lastly, the exercise performed takes into ac-
count that lower residential demand does not result in such a strong decline in 
imports as when there is a fall in domestic demand excluding housing.
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starts also fell in the subsidised housing segment, but much more moderately, resulting in a 
notable increase in their share of all housing starts (up to 50%).
As a result of the shift in saving rates and lower investment in housing, households’ net lend-
ing, which had turned slightly positive again in 2008, after several years of net borrowing, rose 
very significantly in 2009, to 7.1% of GDP. 
Business investment fell by an unprecedented 18% in 2009, as the demand situation was adverse 
(bringing capacity utilisation to an all-time low), the economic outlook (both for Spain and internation-
ally) deteriorated and external financing conditions for firms tightened. Although the costs of bank 
borrowing declined, credit conditions applied by banks tightened over the year and the user cost of 
capital rose in real terms, as inflation fell at a faster pace, against a backdrop of weak demand. Fi-
nancing via the markets was affected by the higher cost of government debt. Moreover, firms’ finan-
cial situation worsened, especially as a result of the decline in profit rates, while debt ratios remained 
high as profits also fell. All these factors act to curb the implementation of investment projects.
Households’ net lending rose 
significantly, to 7.1% of GDP
Business investment contracted 
sharply in 2009, with a change 
of trend in the final stretch of 
the year
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a. Ministry of Housing real estate transaction statistics. In cumulative four-quarter terms. 
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The decline affected all private productive investment components, but especially 
capital goods investment which fell by 28%. Under this heading, there was a particu-
larly severe contraction in investment in machinery, while investment in transport fell 
less sharply, boosted as from the summer by the launch of the Plan 2000E. In turn, 
investment in non-residential construction contracted more moderately, sustained by 
infrastructure investment projects at State-owned companies (see Table 5.3). The de-
cline was widespread across all productive sectors, but was most acute in the indus-
trial branches, in keeping with the sharp contraction in the machinery component. 
Overall, the adjustment in capital goods investment is proving similar to that seen in 
the last recession, but somewhat more severe than that recorded in the euro area (see 
Chart 5.5).
Corporate saving rose moderately in 2009, driven by the sharp drop in interest payments and, 
to a lesser extent, by the reduction in corporate income tax, which together offset the decline 
in gross operating profit (see Chart 5.5). This growth in corporate saving, along with the severe 
contraction in gross capital formation, allowed firms’ net borrowing to be further reduced, to 
2.2% of GDP, 9 pp below the high recorded two years earlier.
The decline was particularly 
significant in capital goods 
investment, reflected in a 
contraction in investment in all 
productive sectors
Lower business investment and 
higher saving allowed firms’ net 
borrowing to be significantly 
reduced
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Lastly, general government demand remained highly dynamic in 2009, backed by the growth 
in public consumption and the strength of public investment, the latter driven by the Local In-
vestment Funds (see Table 5.3). With the consolidation programme introduced by the govern-
ment in the Stability Programme Update and the new package of measures adopted in May 
these effects will be reversed in coming quarters.
The positive contribution of net external demand to GDP growth rose significantly in 2009 to 2.8 pp, 
attenuating the adverse impact of domestic expenditure on the economy. The reason for this in-
crease was the sharp decline in imports of goods and services in real terms (–17.9%), on the back 
of weak final demand, as exports also fell significantly in the year as a whole (–11.5%), against a 
backdrop of severe contraction of international markets (see Chart 5.6). The pace of decline of both 
exports and imports slowed as the year progressed, so that the external sector’s contribution to 
output growth began to moderate in 2009 Q3; however, it is expected to remain positive in 2010.
Despite contracting sharply in the year as a whole, goods exports began to record positive 
quarter-on-quarter growth rates in real terms as from 2009 Q2. This rapid recovery reflected 
the positive impact not only of the global economic recovery, but also of factors connected 
with the extraordinary measures taken in a number of countries to encourage demand; notably 
the car purchase incentive schemes in the EU, which is the market for 80% of Spanish car 
exports, and the infrastructure development programmes in China, which boosted metals 
exports. The gradual disappearance of these measures in 2010 will have an adverse impact 
on Spanish goods exports, but this should be more than offset by the greater dynamism of 
export markets and by price-competitiveness gains, as the developments seen in 2009 con-
tinue (see Chart 5.6).
Spain’s world export share grew, in real terms, in 2009 as a whole, as the gains in share in the 
euro area more than offset the loss in share in the rest of the world (see Chart 5.7).
Services exports also declined considerably in 2009 (−9.6%), especially in the case of non-
tourism services (−12.5%), harshly affected by the slump in goods exports. Tourism receipts 
fell by 7.1% in the year as a whole, slightly more than the decline forecast by the World Tourism 
Organization for receipts worldwide. This reflects the weak consumption of tourists from 
Spain’s main markets, the appreciation of the euro against certain currencies (especially ster-
General government made a 
positive contribution to the 
growth in demand
3.2 EXTERNAL DEMAND
External demand made a 
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ling) and rising competition in the sector in light of the growth of new tourist destinations 
(mainly in the eastern Mediterranean).
Goods imports, like exports, fell significantly in 2009 as a whole, recording a decline of 18.9% 
in annual terms that is unprecedented in the past thirty years. However, the rate of decline 
moderated considerably as the year progressed. Imports were initially affected by the fall in 
domestic expenditure and exports, but in the final stretch of the year both exports and indus-
trial activity in export-oriented sectors recovered, boosting imports, especially of non-energy 
intermediate goods. As was to be expected, in 2009 import penetration continued to decrease 
as a proportion of final demand.
In keeping with other transactions with the rest of the world, services imports fell significantly in real 
terms in 2009 (−14.2%), with little difference in the rates of decline of tourism and of other services. 
As regards tourism expenditure, the combined impact of the slowdown in Spanish  households’ 
income, the decline in wealth, the rebound in the unemployment rate and uncertainties about job 
prospects prompted a shift away from foreign travel and in favour of domestic tourism. This would 
explain the decrease in tourism expenditure in 2009 and would point to a slow recovery.
The contraction in activity affected all sectors of the market economy, prompting a decline in gross 
value added (GVA) of almost 5% in 2009, 1.3 pp above the decline in GDP. In turn, non-market 
services’ GVA rose by 2.5%, although the rate of growth eased notably as the year progressed. 
The industry and energy sector saw the sharpest contraction in GVA, with a decline of almost 
14% in 2009 as a whole (see Chart 5.8). The industrial production index (IPI) shows that the pro-
ductive branches most affected were intermediate goods and, especially, capital goods. Con-
sumer goods production was less adversely affected, thanks to the food component which 
proved more resilient to the crisis owing to the lower income elasticity of demand for these goods. 
The pharmaceutical industry was the only industrial branch to grow, albeit modestly, in 2009.
The rate of decline of the construction sector’s GVA quickened in 2009, to slightly more than 
6%, in a setting in which, as discussed in the previous section, civil engineering work (on the 
back of the State Fund for Local Investment) and residential refurbishment work partly miti-
gated the decrease in new residential building work. In 2010, the State Fund for Local Environ-
mental Sustainability will temporarily help maintain some degree of dynamism in the construc-
tion sector, although the weakness of new housing supply and the large-scale adjustment in 
public investment suggest that the sector’s GVA will continue to head down.
Activity in market services as a whole showed greater resilience than in other productive sec-
tors, though it was unable to escape the effects of the crisis completely. Thus GVA fell by 2% 
in 2009 (after growing by 1.6% in 2008). As the services sector activity indicator shows, the 
contraction was widespread across all branches, but was especially severe in retail trade, 
transport and business services, with rates of decline of 12%-15%. In retail trade, the poor 
performance at the beginning of the year was offset as from the summer due to more moder-
ate prices increases and aggressive sales campaigns.
The labour market amplified the decline in activity: employment fell by 6.7% in 2009, although 
the pace of decline moderated as the year progressed and continued to do so in the opening 
months of 2010 (see Chart 5.9). The fall in employment was most acute in the private sector, 
where almost 2.5 million jobs were lost between the onset of the crisis and the start of 2010. 
Thus, in 2010 Q1 the employment rate stood at 59.1% and was moving away from the EU 
target of 65% for the year.
Goods imports posted a sharp 
contraction, which moderated 
in the second half of the year
4 Activity
GDP fell sharply, as a 
consequence of the severe 
contraction in all branches of 
the market economy
In the construction sector, the 
public stimulus measures partly 
offset the sharp correction in 
residential building work …
… while market services, 
despite showing greater 
resilience, also fell
5 The labour market
The labour market’s structural 
shortcomings were clearly in 
evidence, amplifying the decline 
in economic activity
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Apparent labour productivity rebounded sharply, to 3.3% in the year as a whole (against 0.4% 
between 1995 and 2009). This rebound, which is usual in the Spanish economy in a reces-
sion, is connected in this case with two factors. First, developments in the construction sec-
tor, where the adjustment in the residential segment led to a big increase in average produc-
tivity (22%), in comparison with a gain of 2.5% in the services sector and productivity losses 
(−2.7%) in industry. And second, the concentration of job losses on low-productivity jobs 
(temporary posts, with below-average years of service and skill levels), thus fomenting pro-
ductivity gains. In this setting, the increase in the capital-labour ratio stemming from the se-
vere employment adjustment would have been the determining factor of the rise in apparent 
labour productivity.
Employment in the construction sector fell by almost 24% in 2009. The quarterly pattern 
showed some moderation in the sharp declines seen at the beginning of the year, mirroring the 
effects of the State Fund for Local Investment. Job losses were also very high in industry 
(−11.3%) and in market services (−4.4%). The destruction of jobs was concentrated among 
temporary employees, whose numbers decreased by 18.4% in 2009 and who accounted for 
80% of jobs lost since the start of the crisis. Numbers of permanent employees fell by 0.9%, 
The employment adjustment, 
although broad-based, was 
particularly severe in the 
construction sector and among 
workers with temporary 
contracts and low skill levels
GVA AND EMPLOYMENT BY BRANCH OF ACTIVITY CHART 5.8 
SOURCES: INE and Banco de España. 
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with significant declines in construction and industry only. As a result of these changes, the 
ratio of temporary to total employment stood at 25.4% in 2009, more than 6 pp lower than in 
2007 and the lowest level for 20 years. By group of worker, the job destruction particularly af-
fected men, immigrants, younger workers and the low-skilled, partly as a consequence of their 
greater exposure to the construction sector and temporary employment.
The supply of labour reacted to the pronounced deterioration in the labour market: the par-
ticipation rate declined in the second half of 2009, slowing the growth of the labour force to 
0.8% on average in 2009 (from 3% in 2008). In Q4 the labour force declined at a year-on-year 
rate of –0.4%, which remained unchanged in 2010 Q1. This slowdown also stemmed from 
lower net immigrant entries, which reacted strongly to the less favourable labour market condi-
tions. INE estimates show a decline in inflows, but also a sharp rise in outflows, and in 2010 
Q1 the foreign population actually fell. As a result, the growth of the population was checked, 
The sharp deterioration in the 
labour market curbed both 
immigrant entries and labour 
market participation
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until it remained almost stagnant from late 2009. The impact of the cyclical situation on par-
ticipation decisions was especially strong among men and the younger age groups, among 
which a lengthening of time spent in education and training seems to be discernible. Women’s 
participation remained highly buoyant, although it also began to react to the deterioration in 
the labour market, in particular in the younger and older age groups.
The number of persons unemployed rose by 60.2% in 2009, while the rate of unemployment 
stood at 20% at the beginning of 2010, following the sharp rises in the two previous years. This 
increase was mainly a result of the size of the outflows from employment, which were espe-
cially large among workers with temporary contracts, while outflows from unemployment, al-
though declining since the start of the crisis, remained at a relatively high level. As a result, 
although the relative incidence of long-term unemployment rose, it remained relatively low 
when compared with other recessions (38.7% in 2010 Q1). That said, it already affects almost 
1.8 million persons, and further increases can be expected in coming quarters. As a matter of 
priority therefore, active labour market policies should focus on increasing the employability of 
the large group of unemployed persons generated during this crisis, avoiding the build-up of 
long periods of unemployment, which significantly reduce the probability of finding a job.
Despite the strong deterioration in employment, wages hardly slowed in 2009, beyond a modera-
tion associated with the sharp fall in inflation. This behaviour was closely linked to the limited cyclical 
reaction of wage settlements under collective bargaining agreements, which stood at 2.4% in 2009, 
as against 3.6% in 2008. Not even in the newly signed agreements of 2009 were settlements in line 
with the deterioration in the labour market (the average settlement standing at 2.1%) (see Chart 5.9). 
In revised agreements – the majority, since most collective agreements are for more than one year 
– settlements were higher (2.5%). Collective bargaining is still at an early stage in 2010, but the data 
for settlements in the first four months point to greater wage moderation this year. Collective agree-
ments signed by social agents for the period 2010-12 include wage settlements of 1.3%, and 
newly signed agreements settlements of close to 1%. The significant cut in the wages of public-
sector employees (5% on average), applicable from June 2010, should be reflected in a greater 
degree of moderation in collective bargaining settlements in the private sector.
QNA estimates of compensation per employee reflect these collective bargaining develop-
ments, with an increase of 3.2% in the case of the market economy (3.7% in that of the whole 
economy), which implies positive wage drift1 in 2009 (of some 0.7 pp). This may be related to 
the composition effects arising from the disproportionate destruction of temporary jobs that, 
on average, pay lower wages. Real wages rose again strongly in 2009, at a rate of over 3%, 
following the declines in the years of strong employment growth.
The notable fall in private spending during the recession is contributing to a sharp moderation 
in inflationary pressures in the Spanish economy. This phenomenon is most clearly identified 
using the IPSEBENE (a price index that excludes the most volatile prices) instead of the overall 
index. From the start of Monetary Union until summer 2008, the IPSEBENE grew at high year-
on-year rates, against a background of strong growth in private spending (see Chart 5.10). 
Thereafter, the sharp slowdown in private consumption has been accompanied, albeit with 
some delay, by an equally pronounced deceleration in this measure of inflation. The rate of 
change of the IPSEBENE had thus fallen to –0.1% in April 2010, down 3 pp from the average 
rate in 2008. These developments could be interpreted as reflecting an increase in the sensitiv-
ity of inflation to the cycle, compared with its average level of sensitivity in the past.
The rate of unemployment 
continued to rise, reaching 20% 
in 2010 Q1, ...
... in spite of which, wages rose 
again in real terms, showing 
little sensitivity to the more 
adverse cyclical conditions
6 Prices and costs
Inflation is at historically low 
levels, reflecting the marked fall 
in private spending …
1. Defined as the difference between the increase in compensation per employee according to the QNA and increase in 
wage rates in collective bargaining agreements.
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The greater cyclical containment of prices was the result of two developments. First, there 
was a substantial deceleration in unit labour costs (ULCs) due, not to the behaviour of 
compensation per employee (which, as already indicated, only adjusted very partially to 
cyclical developments), but to the large productivity gains obtained by companies through 
staffing adjustments. And second, business mark-ups, as a proportion of GVA, tended to 
stabilise in 2009, in the case of market services, while in industry they decreased signifi-
cantly.
Within the IPSEBENE, services prices, historically characterised by a high degree of rigidity, 
have decelerated sharply, from around 4% in summer 2008 to 0.8% in April 2010. The con-
traction in spending caused the prices of some services that had been highly rigid – such as 
those provided by restaurants – to become much less expansive. This may indicate a change 
of behaviour which, if confirmed, would greatly facilitate the adjustment that must occur before 
the economy can embark on a new sustainable growth path. The adjustment of the consumer 
prices of non-energy industrial goods has also been notable (from 0.5% at the end of 2008 to 
−1.5% in April 2010), against a backdrop of gradual moderation in the industrial prices of this 
type of good and falling import prices. Noteworthy here has been the reduction in car prices, 
as a consequence of demand weakness.
… which has resulted in 
adjustment of unit labour costs 
and mark-ups
Services and non-energy 
industrial goods prices have 
moderated markedly
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The moderation in the IPSEBENE has been reflected in the overall consumer price index, al-
though the latter has been affected by the volatile path of energy prices. These prices contrib-
uted to the steep slowdown in the overall CPI between summer 2008 and mid-2009 (to –1.4% 
in July), and its subsequent rebound, to 1.4% in March 2010. For the first time since 1952, the 
CPI for the year as a whole fell in 2009, to stand at −0.3% (down 4.4 pp from 2008). Finally, 
the easing of inflationary pressures has been reinforced by falling food prices, to which the 
developments in food commodity prices on international markets and in the prices of imported 
and domestically produced food products have contributed.
Demand deflators decelerated across the board in 2009, reflecting the contraction in activity, 
which led to negative rates for all components, with the exception of government consump-
tion. In this context, the GDP deflator rose by 0.2%, as compared with 2.5% in 2008.
Consumer price inflation fell more steeply in Spain than in the euro area countries as a whole, 
as a consequence, first, of the proportionately larger adjustment in household spending and, 
second, of the stronger moderation in ULCs. Against this background, the inflation differential 
(based on the harmonised index of consumer prices) fell in 2009 as a whole to –0.5 pp, a 
negative value for the first time since the start of Monetary Union, and well below its average 
level during this period (0.9 pp). Although the differential fluctuated markedly, reflecting the 
fluctuations in the energy component, Spanish inflation (measured by the IPSEBENE) has been 
consistently lower than that of the euro area since the beginning of 2009 (see Chart 5.10).
The price-competitiveness and cost indices improved vis-à-vis the main developed countries 
in 2009 (see Chart 5.6). Also, in the case of the euro area, the favourable differentials men-
tioned above in terms of consumer prices and ULCs enabled the trend of falling price com-
petitiveness recorded since 1999 to be turned around.
A scenario of inflation moderation can be expected for 2010 and 2011, with slack demand exert-
ing downward pressure on profit margins. Also, private-sector wage demands will be contained 
by the multi-year agreement for collective bargaining, the high rate of unemployment and the cut 
in public-sector wages. By contrast, the rise in VAT rates will contribute to raising inflation tempo-
rarily, although the size of this effect is expected to be relatively modest, given that weak spending 
will limit the ability of firms to pass on the tax rise by raising their final prices.
The large external deficit of the Spanish economy during the latest cyclical upturn was signifi-
cantly reduced in 2009. On National Accounts data, the nation’s net borrowing was equal to 
4.7% of GDP, 4.4 pp less than in 2008. In the first half of 2010, net borrowing continued to 
decline, although at a slower rate than in the previous year. Box 5.2 analyses the extent to 
which this correction stems from cyclical or temporary factors.
The improvement in the external balance was concentrated in the current account, its deficit 
falling to 5.1% of GDP in 2009 (from 9.5% in 2008), since the capital transactions surplus re-
mained practically unchanged (at 0.4% of GDP) (see Chart 5.11). Within the current account, 
the reduction in the trade deficit (to 4.2% of GDP) was notable, as was, to a much lesser ex-
tent, the reduction in the investment income, current transfers and non-tourism services defi-
cits, while the tourism surplus decreased.
The reduction in net borrowing of the Spanish economy in 2009 mainly reflected the decline in 
investment (by 4.4 pp of GDP, to 24.4%), since the gross national saving rate stabilised at 
around 20% (see Chart 5.12). This aggregate performance was the result of very different 
behaviour in the private and public sectors. In 2009 the financial position of the private sector 
In 2009 as a whole, the overall 
CPI was negative for the first 
time since 1952
The moderation in inflationary 
pressures also affected other 
price indicators
The inflation differential with the 
euro area was negative for the 
first time since the start of 
Monetary Union
… which was conducive to an 
improvement in the Spanish 
economy’s price-
competitiveness indicators
Inflation rates can be expected 
to remain low for the 
foreseeable future
7 The nation’s net 
borrowing and the capital 
account of the institutional 
sectors
The nation’s net borrowing fell 
significantly in 2009, primarily 
on account of the improvement 
in the trade balance
The decline in net borrowing was 
concentrated in the private sector, 
since the public sector’s net 
borrowing increased significantly
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The Spanish economy’s high external deficit at the end of the expan-
sionary phase is being corrected substantially in the current crisis. On 
National Accounts data, the Spanish economy’s net borrowing, after 
peaking at 9.6% of GDP in 2007, fell back to 4.7% of GDP in 2009 
(see Panel 1). This correction is explained fundamentally by the de-
crease in the goods and services trade deficit, which amounted to 
2.1% of GDP in 2009, a considerably lower figure than that posted 
only two years earlier (6.8% of GDP). It is important to assess which 
part of the adjustment is in response to cyclical or temporary factors, 
or to other more permanent factors whose effects, therefore, will not 
disappear when the economic situation improves.
Since the economic slowdown began at the end of 2007, the Span-
ish economy’s cyclical position, approximated by the output gap, has 
deteriorated to a greater degree than that of its main trading partners. 
Furthermore, the impact of the crisis on the external deficit is particu-
larly significant in the case of Spain, given that imports are highly 
sensitive to growth of final demand. Consequently, it can be expected 
that part of the recent correction of the goods and services trade 
deficit will be reversed, ceteris paribus, when the Spanish economy 
resumes a positive growth path. In any event, less buoyant residential 
investment in the future will certainly mean a more permanent correc-
tion of the gap between investment and savings and, consequently, 
that the external deficit will be lower.
The demand equations for the imports and exports of the Spanish 
economy, which were recently re-estimated by the Banco de 
España,1 can be used to estimate the cyclically adjusted goods and 
services trade balance. The latter is calculated in this box as the 
trade balance consistent with closed output gaps.2 This adjusted 
balance only corrects, therefore, for cyclical differences and not for 
other factors such as fluctuations in oil prices and in price competi-
BOX 5.2THE CORRECTION OF THE EXTERNAL DEFICIT IN SPAIN
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tiveness, and should be taken with due caution, given the difficulties 
of accurately estimating changes in potential GDP. According to 
Panel 2, during the last expansionary phase of the Spanish econo-
my, the goods and services trade deficit –which is very close to the 
external primary balance, namely, the total balance excluding inter-
est payments– was systematically higher than the cyclically-adjusted 
balance and this gap widened significantly in the years of highest 
growth (2004-2007). From 2008 there has been a sharp drop in the 
goods and services trade deficit and this decline will foreseeably 
continue in 2010 and 2011 on Banco de España projections, but 
according to this estimate such developments are only attributable 
to a small degree to the improvement in the cyclically adjusted bal-
ance.
The importance of the cycle in the reduction of the goods and serv-
ices trade deficit is seen more clearly in Panel 3, which presents the 
contribution of various factors to the reduction in the external balance 
as a percentage of GDP. The substantial contribution of the cycle to 
the reduction of the deficit in 2008 and 2009 can be seen as well as 
the role of oil price fluctuations, as a result of which the external bal-
ance also improved in 2009. It seems that the other variables –which 
group together very varied factors such as changes in competitive-
ness and in expectations– would hardly explain the variations in the 
last two years, although they could play a part to some extent in the 
improvement forecast for 2010 and 2011.
Recent changes in the current account balance have mainly been 
influenced by the trade in goods and services. However, the im-
provement in the investment income balance and, to a lesser de-
gree, in current transfers have also made a positive contribution to 
correcting the current account balance (see Panel 1). Net income 
payments decreased notably in 2009 (by 0.6 pp of GDP), due to the 
positive impact of lower interest rates since the net debit interna-
tional investment position (IIP) continued to increase (see Panel 4) 
and, consequently, further declines in the short and medium term 
are not expected. Nor does it seems probable that the current trans-
fers deficit will be significantly reduced in future, since transfers to 
Spain from the European Union will foreseeably continue to de-
crease.
The performance of the external deficit is essential for the sustaina-
bility of the nation’s debt. The dynamics of this debt rely on changes 
in the relationship between savings and national investment in the 
future and the economy’s capacity to generate sufficient resources 
to make the payments arising from debt built up in the past. Accord-
ingly, the primary external balance was in deficit in 2009, both in 
terms of the balance observed (−2.9% of GDP) and the cyclically-
adjusted trade balance (around −5%), and, consequently, the Span-
ish economy’s net external debt vis-à-vis the rest of the world will 
tend to continue to grow3. According to projections, the primary 
balance could be close to equilibrium in 2011, but due especially to 
cyclical reasons. Consequently, in order to halt the expected rise in 
external debt, it will be necessary to achieve a permanent primary 
surplus on the current account, which requires improvements to off-
set the negative impact on the deficit of the upturn in the economic 
cycle. In short, Spain’s high reliance on imported inputs, on the one 
hand, and the sensitivity of its exports to changes in competitors’ 
prices, on the other, suggest that a permanent correction of the 
Spanish external deficit requires substantial changes in its produc-
tive structure and a significant improvement in its competitiveness. 
In particular, it would be appropriate to reallocate resources to the 
tradable goods and services sector, which would be bolstered by 
adopting reforms to increase the flexibility of product and factor 
markets.
BOX 5.2THE CORRECTION OF THE EXTERNAL DEFICIT IN SPAIN (cont´d)
3. The external debt position is proxied by the net international investment po-
sition which also includes non-claimable liabilities, such as equity. If this type of 
instrument were excluded from both assets and liabilities, the net IIP would 
decrease to 87% of GDP.
improved considerably, as a result of the increase in saving and the reduction in investment: 
net borrowing by households and non-financial firms of 7% of GDP in 2008 turned into net 
lending of almost 5% of GDP in 2009, a change of 12 pp of GDP in a single year. By contrast, 
general government net borrowing increased significantly again in 2009, with a deficit of 11.2% 
of GDP (7 pp more than in the previous year). In the short term, the correction in the budget 
deficit, along with the slow recovery in private spending, where a certain downward adjust-
ment in investment is still pending, is expected to enable the nation’s net borrowing to con-
tinue to decline.
In line with the developments in net borrowing and the prices of financial instruments that 
make up financial assets and liabilities with the rest of the world, the negative net international 
investment position of the Spanish economy continued to widen during 2009 (to 93.6% of 
GDP, as against 81% at the end of 2008). The tendency for international financial markets to 
The Spanish economy’s 
external debt continued to rise 
in 2009, especially that in the 
form of general government 
debt held by non-residents
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normalise allowed the Spanish economy to cover its net borrowing again through greater re-
course to portfolio investment in fixed income (in particular, public debt).
REST OF THE WORLD ACCOUNT CHART 5.11 
SOURCES: INE, Departamento de Aduanas and Banco de España. 
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